International Criminal Law by Wojcik, Mark E. et al.
International Criminal Law
MARK E. WoJcIK, BROOKE M. BENNETT, DAVID C. ANoTTI, LISA ANN MURPHY, AND
ANNIE STRITZKE*
I. Introduction
This article reviews some of the major developments during the year 2004 in the field
of International Criminal Law. International Criminal Law (ICL) encompasses three broad
areas. The first includes criminal prosecutions of individuals before international courts,
including the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals for
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, and criminal tribunals such as those in Sierra Leone,
Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia.' These prosecutions are for the most serious of crimes,
including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The second area includes the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts to prosecute serious violations of inter-
national criminal law. The third area includes transnational applications of national criminal
law and other matters such as international cooperation in criminal investigations, extra-
dition, and prosecution.
This article cannot survey all of the developments in these three areas. As with other
articles in this issue, the exclusion of a particular topic from discussion here should not be
interpreted as a diminishment of the importance of that topic, but rather, as a necessary
concession to space limitations placed on all articles in this issue, and a recognition that
international criminal law touches upon the jurisdiction and interest of other committees
within the American Bar Association's Section of International Law.
II. The International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted in
1998 and entered into force on July 1, 2002. The ICC is the world's first treaty-based
international criminal court to try the most serious crimes of genocide, war crimes, and
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1. See generally CESARE P.R. RoMANo, ANOdiR NLLKAEMPER, & JANN V_ KLEFFNER, INTERNATIONALIZEDCRIM-
INAL COURTS: SIERRA LEoN, EAST TIMOR, Kosovo, AND CAMsBODIA (Oxford University Press 2004).
280 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
crimes against humanity.' At the end of 2004, ninety-seven nations were parties to the Rome
Statute establishing the court. Additionally, by the end of 2004 twenty countries had ratified
the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court that
entered into force on July 22, 2004.1
The ICC is not an organ of the United Nations but a separate, treaty-based organization.
On October 4, 2004, the President of the ICC concluded the Negotiated Relationship
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations .4 The Agree-
ment governs relations between the ICC and the United Nations, addressing such matters
as permitting U.N. officials to testify before the court.
The most important developments in the ICC are not these agreements, but, rather, the
initiation of investigations. In 2004, pursuant to the Rome Statute and the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence, the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, decided to open
investigations of two situations in Africa. On June 23, he opened the ICC's first investi-
gation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where thousands of people have report-
edly been killed by summary execution and mass murder.' On July 29, 2004, the ICC Chief
Prosecutor also opened an investigation in the Republic of Uganda.6 Further information
about both investigations is available on the court's website. y
11. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established
by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 as a peacekeeping measure under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter.' The ICTY has had jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territories of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991. There is pressure on the ICTY (and its sister institution,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) to conclude its work by 2008, 9 even
2. Further general information about the court is available from the court's website at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
(last visited May 27, 2005). In 2004 the ICC began to publish general newsletters about its work. While only
two issues were published in 2004, the ICC began publishing them again in February 2005.
3. Austria, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand,
Norway, Panama, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Trinidad and Tobago have ratified the
Agreement. Finland is party to the Agreement through acceptance, France through approval, and Liechtenstein
through accession. Sweden ratified the agreement on January 13, 2005. In total, sixty-two States have signed
the Agreement. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Signatures and Ratification of the Agreement
on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (APIC), by Region, at www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/SIGNsRATIFs
APICbyRegion.pdf (last updated Mar. 28, 2005).
4. Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Criminal Court,
U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 154, at Annex, U.N. Doe. A/58/874 (2004), available at http://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/docfUNDOC/GEN/INO4/465/66/pdf/NO446566.pdfOpenElement; G.A. Res. 59/
43, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 146, at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Res./59/43 (2004), available at http://
documents-dds-ny.un.org/docIUNDOC/G.EN/N04/478/84/pdf/N0447884.pdf?OpenElement.
5. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Crim-
inal Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressrealeases/26.html.
6. See Press Release, International Criminal Court, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens
an investigation into Northern Uganda (July 29, 2004), at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/33.html.
7. International Criminal Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int (last visited May 27, 2005).
8. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (providing for
the creation or establishment of the Tribunal), available at http://daccess.dds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/
306/28/-MG/N9330628.pdfOpenElement.
9. War Crimes Tribunal Promotes Plea Deals, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 18, 2002, § 1, at 6.
VOL. 39, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 281
though some trials are just now beginning, 0 and some indicted individuals continue to
elude arrest.
A. SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
The trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic continued throughout 2004.
When the trial began in February of 2002, Milosevic became the first head of state to face
trial before an international criminal tribunal." His trial has moved slowly, partly because
Milosevic has been conducting his own defense and partly due to his health problems.
'After two years of presenting nearly 300 witnesses and thousands of pages of documentary
evidence to support a conviction against Milosevic for alleged war crimes, the prosecution
rested its case on February 25, 2004. Just prior to that, presiding Chief Judge Richard
May announced that he would be stepping down from the bench for health reasons.' 2 In
the following month, Serbian lawmakers decided to pay for the legal fees of certain Serbian
war crime suspects, including Milosevic. 13
After Milosevic began his defense in August of 2004,'4 the Trial Chamber attempted to
assign defense counsel because Milosevic's health problems were unduly delaying the trial.'
The Trial Chamber appointed two British attorneys, Steven Kay and Gilligan Higgins, to
conduct Milosevic's defense.16 According to the rules of ICTY, a defendant may represent
himself, but the court may take away this right and appoint defense counsel "where the
interests of justice so require."' The Trial Chamber's decision was subsequently reversed
by the Appellate Chamber, after Milosevic and many of his defense witnesses refused to
cooperate with the assigned defense counsel, who asked to be removed from the case.'"
Milosevic is again conducting his own defense. The situation, while possibly unique to the
Milosevic trial, presents issues that other tribunals will likely face in the future when de-
fendants attempt to use their trials as political soapboxes. 19 The Milosevic trial has continued
into 2005.
10. Nicholas Wood, A Bosnian Serb Leader Faces War-Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A6.
11. For background on the trial, see MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON
TRIAL: A CoMPANON (Continuum Int'l Pubig. Group 2002).
12. Tom Hundley, Citing Healtb, MilosevicJudge WillStep Down, CHI. TB., Feb. 23, 2004, § 1, at 5.
13. Serbia Votes to Pay Milosevic During His War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A6.
14. See, e.g., Anthony Deutsch, Milosevic Starts Defense With a Volley of Blame, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 2004, § 1,
at 8; Marlise Simons, Milosevic Opens His Defense Case by Going on the Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at
A7.
15. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Milosevic's Defense Delayed 6 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at A6; Marlise
Simons, Court Looks for Ways to Speed Milosevic Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at A9.
16. Anthony Deutsch, Milosevic Snubs Defense Lawyers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2004, § 1, at 4.
17. Marlise Simons, Milosevic Loses Director Role In His Own Courtroom Drama, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at
A3.
18. Marlise Simons, Milosevics Lawyers, Frustrated by Client, Ask to Be Taken Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2004, at A7; see also Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber
Renders Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel in the Milosevic Trial (Nov. 1, 2004), at http://
www.un.org/icty/pressrea/2004/p906-e.htm; see also Milosevic v. Prosecutor, Appeals Chamber, Decision on In-
terlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel (Nov. 1, 2004), at
http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/041101 .htn.
19. See generally Marlise Simons, Lessons From a 'Textbook' War Crimes Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, § 1,
at 12.
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B. OTHER ICTY DEVELOPMENTS
Other ICTY war crime suspects were sentenced in 2004, or had their sentences reviewed
by the ICTY Appellate Chamber.
In March 2004, the Trial Tribunal sentenced Miroslav Deronjic to ten years in prison
for his confessed crimes occurring in the former Yugoslavia. ° Deronjic, the President of
the Bratunac Crisis Staff in May 1992, was initially charged in 2002 on the basis of crimes
against humanity and violations of laws or customs. In court, Deronjic admitted to ordering
an attack on a small Muslim village." In carrying out his order, local police and soldiers of
the Yugoslav Army burned the village, killed about sixty-four people, and deported the
remaining villagers to Muslim-held territory.2 Although Deronjic confessed to the war
crimes, he was given what appears to be an extremely "light" sentence.3 Deronjic was able
to take advantage of the newly implemented plea-bargain strategy employed by the tribunal.
Thus, in exchange for a guilty-plea and evidence to be used in other trials, he was sentenced
to only ten years.24
One landmark Appellate Chamber decision in April 2004 affirmed the genocide convic-
tion of Radislav Kristic, a Bosnian Serb general25 The Appellate Chamber stated that the
1995 massacre of more than 7,000 Muslims in Srebrenica was a crime that should be called
"by its proper name: genocide. '5 6 These killings are viewed as the worst atrocity committed
in Europe since World War 11.27 The bloodshed was "part of a final push by Bosnia's Serb
leadership to create an 'ethnically pure' Serbian state."2" The Appellate Chamber affirmed
Kristic's conviction, but reduced his sentence from forty-six to thirty-five years.
Following the Appellate Chamber's ruling, Serbian officials finally acknowledged their
responsibility for the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica that the Appeals Chamber classified as
genocide. A report detailed the involvement of police and members of the Yugoslav Army,
and identified the locations of many mass graves.29 The public and official acknowledgment
of responsibility for the crimes committed was an unprecedented official admission of the
government's role in committing the international crimes alleged.
IV. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The other international tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter is the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).3°
20. Press Release, International Claims Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment in the Case of the
Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressrealU2004/p834-e.htrn.




25. Marlise Simons, The Hague: Court Affirms Genocide in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 20, 2004, at A6; see also
Press Release, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals ChamberJudgment in the
CaseThe Prosecutor v. Radislav Kristic (Apr. 19, 2004), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p839-e.htm.
26. Id.
27. Nicholas Wood, Serb Leaders Acknowledge '95 Massacre in Srebrenica, Cm. TRi., June 12, 2004, § 1, at 5.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. General information about the court is available at http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited May 27, 2005).
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The President of the ICTR, Judge Erik Mose, reported to the U.N. Security Council in
November 2004 that the ICTR was on schedule to complete all trials by 2008. 1
In December of 2004, the ICTR Appellate Chamber affirmed the genocide convictions
and sentences of a senior pastor of the Seventh Day Adventist Church in Mugonero, Eli-
zaphan Ntakirutimana, and his son Dr. Grard Ntakirutimana, a medical practitioner." In
2003, they were sentenced to ten and twenty-five years in prison, respectively. The pastor
had previously fought (all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court) his extradition from the
United States to the international tribunal. 3
V. The Khmer Rouge Trials
Twenty-five years have passed since the atrocities committed by the Communist Party
of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge, were brought to an end. Many of the
leaders during the period of Democratic Kampuchea still live freely among the people of
Cambodia, never having been prosecuted for their crimes. In 2004, the United Nations
and the Royal Government of Cambodia finally agreed on a court to try those accused of
killing an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians, over one quarter of their population. 4 In
2004, Cambodia approved an agreement with the U.N., with whom it had been negotiating
with for over seven years, to prosecute the leaders of the Khmer Rouge. On October 27,
2004, Cambodia's Head of State, Chea Sim, promulgated a law in accordance with an
agreement to establish a U.N.-assisted Extraordinary Chamber to try former Khmer Rouge
leaders. 5 The agreement between Cambodia and the U.N. ended more than seven years
of contentious negotiations.
The U.N. initiated an investigation of Khmer Rouge violations of Cambodian and in-
ternational law in April of 1997. Shortly thereafter, the First Prime Minister of Cambodia,
Prince Norodom, and the Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan requesting "assistance of the United Nations and the international
community in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and crimes
against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979."'
6
In response to the letter, the U.N. General Assembly issued Resolution 52/135, in which
the U.N. requested Kofi Annan examine the Cambodian request and possibly establish a
group of experts to investigate bringing Khmer Rouge members to justice. 7 Kofi Annan
31. President & Prosecutor Update Security Council on Completion Strategy, ICTR NEWSLErrER, Nov.
2004, at 18, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISVnewsletter/novO4November2OO4.pdf.
32. Appeals Chamber Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ntaldrutimana, ICTR-96-10-A & ITCR-96-17-A, available
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/NtakirutimanaE/Judgment/Arret/Index.htm.
33. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000).
34. Identical Letters Dated 15 March 1999 From the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly
and the President of the Security Council, 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 110(b), at 35,
U.N. Doc. A/53/850 (1999), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrt/cambodia-1999.html [hereinafter
Group of Experts Report].
35. Amended Khmer Rouge Tribunal Law Promulgated, JAPAN EcoN. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 5, 2004, available at 2004
WL 64867594.
36. Id.; see also Letterfrom Norodom Ranariddh, Cambodian First Prime Minister, and Hun Sen, Cambodian Second
Prime Minister, to Secretary- General Annan, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 110, U.N. Doc.
A/51/930 (June 21, 1997).
37. G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 70th Mtg., Agenda Item 112(b), at 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
52/135 (1997).
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appointed three experts to examine the situation in Cambodia." The Group of Experts
traveled throughout Cambodia and evaluated existing evidence of the atrocities committed
by the Khmer Rouge. 9 After considering several different means to prosecute the Khmer
Rouge, the Group of Experts recommended that the U.N. establish an ad hoc international
tribunal in a state in the Asia-Pacific region other than Cambodia.4° In addition to the type
of court, the Group also recommended that the U.N. appoint the judges and that the
prosecutors for the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda serve as the prosecutors for the new tribunal.
On August 10, 2001, in what was essentially a rejection of the Group of Expert's pro-
posal, 41 Cambodia adopted the Law on Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers.)42
Unlike the U.N. proposal, the court established by the Cambodian Government would be
held in Cambodia with Cambodian and international judges and prosecutors.43 The U.N.
refused to participate under the terms of the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary
Chambers and subsequently pulled out of negotiations." The U.N. believed that this type
of trial would not guarantee the independence, impartiality, and objectivity that an inter-
national court must have. 4s Based on the current judicial system in Cambodia, the U.N.
feared that a court with a majority of Cambodian judges could be heavily influenced and
interfered with by the Cambodian Government.-
Even though the official negotiations had ceased, the U.N. continued to communicate
with Cambodia through U.N. Legal Counsel, Hans Corell.47 In December 2002, the U.N.
38. Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 948, 949 (1999).
39. Id.
40. Group of Experts Report, supra note 34, at 219.
41. Cambodia initially rejected the Group of Experts proposals outright, abandoning the idea of an inter-
national court. Ramer, supra note 38, at 952. It intended to try Khmer Rouge officials in its domestic courts
without international help. Id. With aid from the United States, Cambodia continued to negotiate a com-
promise with the UN that would include the international community. See STEPHEN HE.DER & BRIAN D.
TTTEMORE, SEVEN CANDIDATES FOR PROSECUTION: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE CRIMES OF THE KHMER ROUGE,
19 (War Crimes Research Office, American University 2001), available at http://www.cij.org/pdf/seven
candidates- for-prosecution_ Cambodia.pdf.
42. See Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Reach Kram NS/RKM/0801/12 (August
10, 2001), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/index.him.
43. Id.
44. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Cambodia: Flawed Trials in No One's Best Interest, Al Index ASA 23/




47. Letter from Sok An, Senior Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council of Ministers, Kingdom of
Cambodia, to His Excellency Hans Corell, Under Secretary-General, and The Legal Counsel of the United
Nations (January 22, 2002), available at http://www.mfaic.gov.kh/Information/Bulletin/2002/February/Feb
%202002%2OBulletin.htm; Letter from Sok An, Senior Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council of
Ministers, Kingdom of Cambodia, to His Excellency Hans Corell, Under Secretary-General, and The Legal
Counsel of the United Nations (November 23, 2001), available at http://www.ocm.gov.kh/ocm/government/
governmentl 16.htm. See also Statement, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Secretary-
General Replies to Cambodian Prime Minister's Letter on the Trial of Khmer Rouge L~aders (August 20,
2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view0l/lD6lF44196A25F19C1256CIC00309
DED?opendocument.
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issued Resolution 57/228, which requested Kofi Annan resume negotiations with Cambodia
under the stipulation that the negotiations "ensure that the Extraordinary Chambers ex-
ercise their jurisdiction in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and
due process of law" and emphasize "the importance of ensuring the impartiality, indepen-
dence and credibility of the process, in particular with regard to the status and work of the
judges and prosecutors. '" 48 The U.N. and Cambodiareached a final agreement in the sum-
mer of 2003.49 On May 13, 2005, the U.N. adopted the Agreement between the United
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under the
Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
("2003 Agreement").50 After the 2003 Cambodian national elections, the political parties
were unable to reach a consensus on their roles in the government, leaving Cambodia
without a functioning parliament and delaying the approval of the 2003 Agreement."1 The
National Assembly did not convene until almost a year later on August 2, 2004.1
2
Once in session, Cambodia's national legislature did not hesitate to ratify the 2003 Agree-
ment. The National Assembly discussed the Khmer Rouge Trials four days after it first
convened, but was unable at that time to approve the 2003 Agreement because of technical
errors.5 3 On October 4, 2004, once the errors were resolved, the National Assembly ap-
proved amendments to the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers,
which were in accordance with the 2003 Agreement. 4 The Senate of the Kingdom of
Cambodia approved the amendments on October 8, 2004, and the Cambodian Head of
State, Chea Sim, ratified the amendments on October 19, 2004.15 The new law was pro-
mulgated to the people of Cambodia by Chea Sim on October 27, 2004.56 Cambodian
officials expect the Khmer Rouge trials to last three years, beginning in mid-2005.57
The 2003 Agreement and the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers,
as adopted and amended, establish two levels of court chambers-the Trial Court Chambers
and the Supreme Court Chambers. 8 The Trial Court Chamber will consist of five judges-
three Cambodian judges and two international judges.5 9 Appeals from the Trial Chamber
48. G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 57th Sess., 77th Plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 109(b), at 1-5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/228 (2002).
49. The World in Brief, THE WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at A20.
50. G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 57th Sess., 85th Plen. Mtg., Agenda Item 109(b), at 1, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/57/228B (2003).
51. Alan Sipress, Khmer Rouge Trials Stalled by Political Deadlock, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at A24.
52. Cambodian National Assembly First Sessions Set for 2 August, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, July 30,2004,
available at http://www.lexis.com.
53. "Mistakes" Cause New Delay for Khmer Rouge Tribunal in Cambodia, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 27, 2004,
available at www.wesdaw.com.
54. See Law Approving the Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia
Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea, Reach Kram NS/RKM/1004/004 (October 19, 2004), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/
krt/english/index.htm.
55. Id.
56. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers, with Inclusion of Amendments, Reach
Kram NS/RKM/1004/006 (October 27, 2004), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/english/law%20
on%20establishment.htm [hereinafter Reach Kram NS/RKM/1004/006].
57. Khmer Rouge Trial May Begin in Mid-2005, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS, Dec. 13, 2004, available at www.
findarticles.com.
58. Reach Kram NS/RKM/1004/006, supra note 56, at 2.
59. Id. at 9.
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will be heard by the Supreme Court Chamber, which will consist of seven judges-four
Cambodian judges and three international judges.60 The Supreme Court Chamber will
serve both as the appellate court and as the court of final instance.61 To reach an affirmative
decision, both Chambers require a super-majority.6 Decisions made by the Trial Court
Chamber require affirmative votes from at least four of the five judges, and decisions made
by the Supreme Court Chamber require affirmative votes from at least five of the seven
judges.63 The defendant will be released if a super-majority cannot be reached by the
judges.64 The international judges for both Chambers will be selected by the Cambodian
Supreme Council of the Magistracy from a list of nominees generated by the U.N.
Secretary-General.65
The prosecution will have one Cambodian prosecutor and one international prosecutor
responsible for deciding whom to charge with what crimes and for presenting evidence to
the court.66 One Cambodian and one international investigating judge will be responsible
for collecting and investigating evidence and determining if a case can proceed to trial. 67 If
either of the co-prosecutors or the co-investigating judges disagrees on whether to take a
case to trial, the case will proceed to trial.6 The dissenting party can appeal to a Pre-Trial
Chamber that has a five-judge composition similar to the Trial Chamber.69 Decisions not
to take a case to trial require a super-majority vote and will advance if the judges cannot
reach a majority.70 The international prosecutor and investigating judge will be selected by
the Cambodian Supreme Council of the Magistracy from a list of nominees generated by
the U.N. Secretary-General.7
The 2003 Agreement and the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers,
as adopted and amended, provide additional safeguards to ensure that the accused receive
due process in accordance with the international standards of justice and fairness set out in
articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2 The
procedure of the Extraordinary Chambers will be held in accordance with Cambodian
Law.73 Where there is uncertainty regarding Cambodian Law, the courts may use inter-
national law.1
4
Under article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the accused
have the right to a fair and public hearing in which they shall be presumed innocent until
proven guilty, obtain counsel of their choice or have counsel provided if they do not have
sufficient means to pay for it, have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, examine
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id. at 20, 23.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 18, 26.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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or have examined the witnesses against them, and not be compelled to testify against
themselves. 7
s
The amended law also prevents the Cambodian Government from granting any addi-
tional amnesties or pardons to persons responsible for the crimes committed by the Khmer
Rouge.76 Moreover, the Extraordinary Chambers has the authority to determine the validity
of prior pardons made by the Cambodian Government.
77
The 2003 Agreement and the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers,
as adopted and amended, provide that the accused will only be charged with crimes rec-
ognized by Cambodia during the period from April 17, 1975 to January 6, 1979.78 The
Extraordinary Chambers will have subject matter jurisdiction under international law for
the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, destruction of cultural property during armed conflict, and crimes against inter-
nationally protected persons. 79 In addition, the Extraordinary Chambers will have subject
matter jurisdiction under domestic law as set forth in the 1956 Penal Code of Cambodia
for the crimes of homicide, torture, and religious persecution. 0 Life imprisonment is the
maximum penalty the Extraordinary Chambers can issue for conviction of any of these
crimes."'
Amnesty International and other members of the international community have ex-
pressed concerns that the structure and format of the Extraordinary Chambers still do not
ensure the proper safeguards in order to protect international standards of justice and fair-
ness. The international community is concerned that the format of the Extraordinary
Chambers will not guarantee the necessary impartiality and independence that an inter-
national court requires.8 2 There exists a fear, even with the provision requiring a super-
majority vote, that the Cambodian Government will still have a strong influence over the
trials and have the ability to interfere with decisions. 3 There are also concerns that Cam-
bodia's judiciary is not adequately prepared to handle a task of this magnitude,84 and that
there are not enough safeguards to prevent the government and members of the Khmer
Rouge from influencing and threatening potential witnesses who may participate in the
trials. 8s
The Cambodian Government expressed several reasons for the current structure, format,
and location of the Khmer Rouge Trials. The main rationale behind keeping the trials in
Cambodia is to help the people of Cambodia receive justice and reconciliation for the
atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge trials will be open to the
75. Id. at 35.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2-8.
79. Id. at 4-8.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 38-39.
82. Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation's Responsibility to Withdraw Involvement from
the Establishment of Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REv. 893, 933-47 (2004).
83. See Group of Experts Reports, supra note 34, at 157-58.
84. Id. at 127.
85. Id. at 130; see also Luftglass, supra note 82, at 946-47 ("Victims and witnesses will not come forward to
testify without the necessary assurances for their safety from international, rather than domestic authorities").
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public, televised, and broadcast outside the court.8 6 Another reason for keeping the trials
in Cambodia and including Cambodian judges and prosecutors is to demonstrate the le-
gitimacy of Cambodia's new Government to the Cambodian people and to the international
community.87 The Cambodian Government wants to demonstrate that it is able to maintain
peace, political stability, and national unity." In addition, by keeping the trials in Cambodia
under Cambodian law, the Government hopes to demonstrate national sovereignty of mat-
ters concerning the Cambodian people. 9
Optimistically, starting in 2005, the people most responsible for the atrocities committed
by the Khmer Rouge will be held accountable for their actions, and the people of Cambodia
will begin to experience the justice and reconciliation that they have been without for over
twenty-five years. After seven years of negotiations, the Cambodian Government and the
U.N. have finally established a court system in which both international and Cambodian
parties are involved. Whether the format of the Extraordinary Chambers will ensure the
proper safeguards necessary to conduct a fair and impartial trial that meets international
standards and quells the concerns of the international community remains to be seen.
VI. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
The year 2004 was extremely important for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL)
as it saw the opening of the courthouse in March and the beginning of the first trials in
June and July. The courthouse opening was eagerly awaited by the population of Sierra
Leone, a small country of almost 5.9 million inhabitants, located on the western coast of
Africa between Guinea and Liberia.90 Sierra Leone was ravaged between 1991 and 2002 by
a civil war pitting government forces against rebel factions resulting in tens of thousands
of deaths.91 The Revolutionary United Front (RUE) and its leader, Foday Sankoh, com-
mitted multiple atrocities, such as amputations and rapes, in their effort to gain control of
the country's diamond mines.92 At the time, the RUF was backed by the President of Li-
beria, Charles Taylor, who furnished them with weapons in exchange for diamonds. 93 The
Civil Defense Forces (CDF), a pro-government faction led by Sam Hinga Norman, was
also involved in committing atrocities against the population of Sierra Leone. 94 Even though
the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone negotiated a peace agreement at Lome, Togo
in 1999, the hostilities did not end until 2002.91 In June 2000, the President of Sierra Leone,
86. Secretariat of the Royal Government Task Force, An Introduction to the Khmer Rouge Trials, at http://
www.combodia.gov.kh/krt/english/introduction-eng/(last visited May 27, 2005).
87. His Excellency Sok An, Senior Minister, Minister in Charge of the Office of the Council of Ministers,
Kingdom of Cambodia, The Rule of Law and the Legacy of Conflict, Presented at Gaborne, Botswana (Jan.
16-19, 2003), at http://www.camnet.com.kh/ocm/government/governmentl 3 9.htm.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. CIA, The World Factbook: Sierra Leone, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
sl.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
91. Id.
92. Global Policy Forum, Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intjustice/sierra
indx.htm (last visited May 27, 2005).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. International Center for Transitional Justice, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months
(March 2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/sc-sl-case-study-designed.pdf.
VOL. 39, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 289
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, asked the U.N. to help his country set up a special tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed during the civil war.96
On August 14, 2000, the U.N. Security Council, in Resolution 1315 (2000), requested
that the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, negotiate an agreement with the government of
Sierra Leone to set up a special court to prosecute those responsible for the violations of
international humanitarian laws during the civil war.97 In January 2002, the U.N. and the
government of Sierra Leone signed the agreement establishing the SCSL.9s The SCSL was
designed as a "hybrid tribunal," with mixed jurisdiction and composition. The mandate of
the SCSL only extends to the prosecution of those "who bear the greatest responsibility
for serious violations of international humanitarian law" committed in Sierra Leone after
November 30, 1996.99 The courthouse for the Special Court for Sierra Leone opened of-
ficially on March 10, 2004.100
The Special Court includes the office of the Prosecutor, which is responsible for inves-
tigating, indicting, and prosecuting those accused of committing atrocities during the civil
war, the office of the Principal Defender, which ensures that the rights of the accused are
protected, and the Registry which is responsible for providing administrative support to
the Court, the Trial Chamber, and an Appeals Chamber.'0'
On May 7, 2004, in an unprecedented decision, the Trial Chamber approved a motion
by prosecutors to add a new count of "forced marriage" to the indictments issued against
the three leaders of the RUF and Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).102 This
new count arises under the category of "sexual violence." 03 During the civil war, a wide-
spread practice of the rebel forces was to capture women, sexually assault them, and force
them to bear children.' °4 This decision of the SCSL is ground breaking, as it will be the
first time under international law that "forced marriage" will be prosecuted as a crime
against humanity.0
The Appeals Chamber consists of five judges. 06 Two judges were appointed by the gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone, while the other three were appointed by the Secretary General.
0 7
In May 2004, Justice Ayoola of Nigeria became Presiding Justice over the Appeals Chamber
96. Id.
97. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, Appendix 2, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002), available at http:H
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/274/42/img/N0227442.pdf? OpenElement.
98. Id.
99. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/specialcourtstatute.htmI (last visited May 27, 2005).
100. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court for Sierra Leone Officially Opens New
Courthouse (March 10, 2004), at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-031004.html.
101. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Basic Facts, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/basicfactspamphlet.pdf (last
visited May 27, 2005).
102. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber Approves New Count of Forced Marriage
(May. 7, 2004), at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-050704.html.
103. Id.
104. Angela Stephens, Forced Marriage Pursued as Crime in Sierra Leone Tribunal Cases, UN WiP.E (Apr. 16,
2004), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/sierra/ 20 0 4/O4 16marriage.htm.
105. Id.
106. Special Court for Sierra Leone, The Appeals Chamber, at http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html (last vis-
ited May 27, 2005).
107. Id.
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and President of the Special Court.' He was appointed along with Justice Fernando of Sri
Lanka, the Vice President, and Justice Winter of Austria by the Secretary General of the
U.N.109 Justice Ayoola replaced Justice Robertson who had completed his term as President
of the SCSL." o The Presiding Justice is elected for a non-renewable term of one year."'
The Government of Sierra Leone appointed Justice Robertson of the United Kingdom and
Justice King of Sierra Leone."'
An historic decision was reached on June 1, 2004 when the Appeals Chamber, in a ma-
jority decision, ruled that recruitment of child soldiers was a crime under international
law."' The Defense Counsel for one of the accused had argued that it was not a crime
under international law to recruit child combatants at the time the acts were accom-
plished." 4 In reaching its decision, the Court looked at both international agreements and
international customary law."' The Court found that, under international customary law,
the prohibition against recruiting children as soldiers had been widely recognized and ac-
cepted before November 1996, and that it had been considered a war crime long before
being expressly "set out as an international crime in treaty law."' 6 For the first time, an
international war crimes tribunal is prosecuting child recruitment."'
Another important decision was reached by the Appeals Chamber on March 13, 2004,
when it refused to recognize an amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity granted
to the rebel forces under article IX of the Lome Peace Agreement."l8 The Court found that
it had jurisdiction to try the indicted because, as an international tribunal, it was not subject
to the constitution of Sierra Leone, and furthermore, the U.N. had not been a party to the
Peace Agreement."9 It concluded that "[t]he amnesty granted under Article IX of the Lome
Peace Agreement does not bar the prosecution of an accused for international crimes com-
mitted before July 1999 before the Special Court."' 2'
As an independent international tribunal sitting in the country in which the conflict
occurred and staffed with a mixture of international and national members, the Special
Court differs in many ways from other international tribunals such as the ICTR and the
ICTY."' The Special Court has faced some difficulties this year based on these differences.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.; Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Justice Renate Winter to Act as President of the
Special Court (Mar. 16, 2004), at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-031604.hml.
111. Id.; see also Appeals Cbamber, supra note 106.
112. Appeals Cbamber, supra note 106.
113. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber Rules Recruitment of Child Com-
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One of the major differences between the SCSL and the both ICTY and ICTR is found
in the mandates under which they were established.2' The ICTR and ICTY were created
under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, while the SCSL was created by an agreement
between the U.N. and the government of Sierra Leone. 3 The ICTY and ICTR are under
U.N. jurisdiction and operate independently of Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia.2 4 These
courts have the authority under chapter VII to order governments to cooperate with
them.' The Special Court does not have that power and must instead rely on the willing-
ness of other governments to act on its requests. 2 6 This has proven to be a major drawback
as the Court has not yet been able to obtain the extradition of Charles Taylor from
Nigeria. 7
Another important difference between the SCSL and other international tribunals is the
fact that the court is staffed by both international and national members in all of its different
offices, including the Chambers.2 8 An advantage of including nationals is that it helps the
SCSL run more efficiently and increases its legitimacy amongst the population of Sierra
Leone.2 9 One of the criticisms faced by the Court concerning its staffing is that, at this
time, most of the key decision-making positions are held by international recruits, such as
Americans, the British and Australians, while Sierra Leoneans have been relegated to menial
office tasks.1 °
Unlike the tribunal for Rwanda, which sits in Arusha, Tanzania, and the tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, which sits in The Hague, Netherlands, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone is located in the country in which the conflict occurred.' 3 ' The Court's location in
Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, allows the population of the country to be more involved
and more connected to the prosecution of the accused, unlike the ICTR and ICTY which
have very little impact on the populations or the judicial systems of Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia.' The security of the Special Court, because of its location, is the main chal-
lenge faced by the court. 13 3 This concern has been brought to the forefront this year as the
case against Sam Hinga Norman, a leader of the CDF regarded by many Sierra Leoneans
as a hero and liberator, is being heard by the Court.
3 4
As of 2004, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has indicted eleven people.'35 Those
indicted are all associated with the three warring factions which ravaged the country during
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the civil war. 136 These three factions are the RUF, the CDF and the AFRC. The accused
are charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law.'37 The charges include, among other things, "murder, rape,
extermination, acts of terror, enslavement, looting and burning, sexual slavery, conscription
of children into an armed force, and attacks on United Nations peacekeepers and human-
itarian workers."'' 1 On January 27, 2004, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court ruled that
the nine accused in the court's custody should be tried jointly in three groups, based on
the faction to which they belonged during the civil war. 13 9 The Trial Chamber is currently
holding the trials of the CDF and RUF members.'- The Court hears each case for about
one month at a time, on a rotating basis.141
On June 3, 2004, trial began at the Special Court for former members of the CDE 41
The three accused, Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, and Allieu Kondewa are facing
an eight-count indictment for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious vio-
lations of international humanitarian law. 41 The charges against the CDF accused include
"unlawful killings, physical violence and mental suffering, looting and burning, terrorizing
the civilian population and collective punishment, and the use of child soldiers."' 44
In a surprising move, reminiscent of Milosevic in The Hague, Sam Hinga Norman stood
up before the Court on the first day of trial and requested that he be allowed to represent
himself.' 41 Even though the Trial Chamber ruled unanimously that the accused had a right
to self-representation, it found that the right was not absolute and could only be exercised
with the assistance of counsel.' 46 At present, Hinga Norman represents himself with the
assistance of three court-appointed counsels.' 47 The indictment of Sam Inga Norman was
controversial at the time it was announced and still is today, as many people in Sierra Leone
consider him a hero and a liberator for having fought the rebel forces. 14 Norman was
Minister of Internal Affairs in the present Sierra Leone government at the time of his
arrest.
149
The trial for the three former leaders of the RUT started on July 5, 2004.10 Issa Hassan
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war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international human-
itarian law.'' The charges against these three former leaders of the RUF include terrorizing
the civilian population, collective punishments, unlawful killings, sexual and physical vio-
lence, the use of child soldiers, abductions and forced labor, looting and burning, and attacks
on United Nations peacekeepers.'2
On March 13, 2004, the Appeals Chamber ruled that Justice Geoffrey Robertson would
be allowed to stay on the Special Court, but would be barred from adjudicating in the trial
involving RUF accused." s3 The RUF defense team had asked for the removal of Justice
Robertson from the Court because of bias against the RUF defendants. 54 Although Justice
Robertson is regarded as "one of Britain's leading human rights lawyers," his objectivity
came into question because of a book he had written a few years earlier depicting the RUF
as a "bloodthirsty criminal enterprise." 5' Justice Robertson had also accused the RUF in
his book of "grotesque crimes against humanity." 56 Justice Robertson had refused to step
down on his own.' The Special Court based its ruling upon the fact that his book, Crimes
Against Humanity: the Struggle for Global Justice, could be seen as prejudicing the hearings.' 8
Witnesses began testifying this year at the Special Court in the RUF trial. 5 9 Their stories
reveal the horror of the atrocities they faced at the hands of this faction. 160 Their testimony
includes accounts of rebels using machetes to cut off hands and feet, raping pregnant women
and killing children.' 6' Some of the rebels enlisted by the RUF included children as young
as five years old. 62 One of the witnesses testified that he had been abducted by the RUF at
the age of twelve and forced to rape a fifteen year old girl at gun point.16 Many more
witnesses are scheduled to testify before the end of the trial.
In 2003, three former leaders of the AFRC, Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara,
and Santigie Borbor Kanu, were indicted on eighteen counts of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law 64 Their trial has not
yet started.16s
As of today, nine accused are standing trial before the Special Court.'- Four others were
indicted on March 7, 2003.167 Those indicted included former Liberian President Charles
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Taylor, RUF leaders Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie, and former AFRC leader Johnny
Paul Koroma.' 61 Sankoh and Bockarie both died before their trials commenced, and the
indictments against them were withdrawn on December 8,2003.169 The location of Koroma
is currently unknown, but he is believed to be dead. 170
Charles Taylor is in exile in Nigeria where he was given asylum in August 2003 after
being forced from power in Liberia. 7' On May 31, 2004, the Appeals Chamber ruled that
the former Liberian President was subject to criminal proceedings before the Special
Court.17 2 His defense counsel argued that, as a sitting president at the time of his indictment
in 2003, he was immune from prosecution under international customary law. His counsel
had also argued that the Special Court, as a national court, did not have jurisdiction to
indict Charles Taylor. In a landmark decision, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the fact
that the former Liberian President was a head of state at the time of his indictment was not
a bar to his prosecution. The Appeals Chamber further found that the Special Court is not
part of Sierra Leone's judicial system but is a true international criminal court formed under
international law and, as such, has jurisdiction over the former President.' Currently,
Charles Taylor remains in Nigeria because the Nigerian government has not yet agreed to
extradite him to Sierra Leone to stand trial. 174 Even though the Chief Prosecutor, David
Crane, is optimistic that Nigeria will allow the repatriation of the former Liberian President
to Freetown, others do not agree.' In October 2004, Sierra Leone's President, Ahmed
Tejan Kabbah, endorsed the Nigerian government's decision to grant asylum to Charles
Taylor.176 President Kabbah further added that he would not pressure Nigeria's President
Obassanjo to hand over Charles Taylor to the Special Court.'77
Since the first trials opened on June 3, 2004, the SCSL has received criticism from some
and praise from others. Many are concerned with the fact that the Special Court is limited
in time, by only being able to prosecute crimes committed after 1996 and by its mandate
to only bring to justice "persons who bear the greatest responsibility."'' They fear that the
Special Court will not be able to hold accountable those who committed atrocities but were
not in leadership positions. At this time, the major problem faced by the Special Court,
besides its lack of funding, is the fact that Nigeria has not yet surrendered Charles Taylor.
Justice for the population of Sierra Leone will not be done until one of the main instigators
of the conflict is brought before the Special Court to answer for his crimes.
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VII. Sudan
Sudan frequently occupied headlines in 2004. Articles with buzzwords such as genocide
and Janjaweed trailed behind the headlines providing comprehensive details of the current
situation in Sudan. But the articles could not predict what would come next for the country.
While it is easy to see how the situation escalated, 7 9 it is difficult to determine how to
restore stability to a region plagued by internal strife and international indifference.
In 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted a series of resolutions in response to the
ongoing situation in Sudan. On June 11, 2004, the Security Council recognized the need
for a U.N. advanced team dedicated to international monitoring of Sudan. The Security
Council also called for the team to prepare a peace support operation that would be intro-
duced once the involved parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement.8 0 Additionally,
the resolution stressed the need for a public information campaign that would foster an
understanding of the peace process.' The June 11 th resolution made clear that the U.N.
would take a strong stance on the situation in Sudan, but would simultaneously attempt to
keep the Sudanese people informed.
On July 30, 2004, the Security Council took notice of the fact that the situation in Darfur
was not improving, and its response took a tone which bordered on scolding. The resolution
expressed the general concern of the Council that the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of
April 8, 2004, was not being adhered to, and chastised the government of Sudan for failing
to disarm Janjaweed militias. 82 The resolution went so far as to state that, in the event of
continuing non-compliance, the Security Council would consider further actions. Actions
under article 41 of the U.N. Charter would include interruption of economic relations and
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, as well as the
severance of diplomatic relations.
8 3
On September 18, 2004, the Security Council expressed grave concern about the lack of
progress in the area of civilian security.8 4 These concerns resulted in a request by the
Security Council that the Secretary General establish an international inquiry commission
to investigate alleged violations of international humanitarian law.'
Reactions to the September 18th meeting varied. Several speakers praised the balanced
nature of Resolution 1564, while others argued that threatened sanctions were not the most
179. The current problems in Sudan find their roots in the actions of then President Nimeiri in 1983. The
United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention: Building Legitimacy by Confronting Our Past-An Open Letter, 16
FLA. J. INrr'L L. 483, 506-07 (2004). Nimeiri, housing a strong desire to impose his government's version of
Islamic law on all of Sudan, led the country into a civil war which devastated the region for the next twenty-
plus years. Id. While the southern Sudanese were represented by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM), the National Islamic Front (NIF) gained power in the North when they funneled their discontent
with Nimeiri into a coup which successfully overthrew the president. Id. This allowed the NIF to take control
of the entire Sudanese government in Khartoum, and secured the NIF's ability to systematically eliminate all
political and religious dissent. Id. The international community eventually took notice in 1989, and imple-
mented various measures to alleviate the situation, but the tactics proved unsuccessful. Id. at 507-08. To this
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diplomatic way to handle the crisis in Sudan.18 6 Sudan's representative to the meeting con-
sidered the resolution to be a "fatal blow" and alleged that the resolution failed to consider
the Sudanese government's progress.187 Regardless of the varied reactions, one thing was
clear-the situation in Sudan was quickly deteriorating and affirmative measures needed
to be taken. Security Council Resolutions 1547, 1556, and 1564 set the stage for interna-
tional actors who hoped to close the curtain on offenses against the civilians of Sudan. In
evaluating what is to come for Sudan, however, enforcing norms of international criminal
law must be done to resolve this crisis.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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